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CryptoHarry
Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/adjust-sdola-auction-and-dsa-parameters-2/575
This proposal refines the economic parameters that govern the DOLA Savings Account (DSA) and the sDOLA–DBR XY-K auction. The goal is to:
Since launching in February 2024, sDOLA and the DSA have returned >$764 k to depositors. TVL has grown to >$33 m, consistently placing sDOLA among the highest-yielding stablecoins on Ethereum.
sDOLA utility spans four pillars:
Stableswap-ng pools handle sDOLA yield, fully returning it to liquidity providers. This makes sDOLA a compelling stablecoin for other issuers to pair with due to its constant yield. Current pairings include:
sDOLA/scrvUSD: ~$3.84M TVL
sDOLA/alUSD: ~$3.95M TVL
sDOLA/reUSD: ~$3.41M TVL
sDOLA as collateral in lending markets allows users to leverage the spread between sDOLA yield and borrowing costs. It also enables leveraging DOLA during depegs for potential profits upon repegging. Key metrics:
Curve Lend (Market 1 and 2): ~$24.95M sDOLA collateral with ~$23.87M crvUSD borrowed
sDOLA is used as a yield trading instrument, allowing users to take long (via fixing) or short positions on the yield
Spectra: ~$1.2M TVL
Pendle: ~$0.7M TVL
sDOLA benefits the DAO by driving DOLA purchases from the open market. This creates equivalent lending capacity, which, when utilized, results in more DBR burn than DBR issuance spent.
Max DBR per DOLA per Year
Current: 0.95
Proposed: 0.95 (unchanged)
Rationale: In order to help promote the initial growth of sDOLA, the DAO opted for an extremely thin margin on sDOLA earnings. In order to continue the current growth momentum of sDOLA, we are not proposing to increase the current margin for the DAO. It should be noted that this will need to be done eventually, in order to allow for sustainable growth.
Max Yearly Reward Budget
Current: 30M DBR/year
Proposed: 60M DBR/year
Rationale: Doubling the yearly reward budget ensures sDOLA has sufficient room to scale into emerging opportunities at the proposed max DBR rate, fully capitalizing on its potential.
Objective:
The recent influx of sDOLA deposits presents an opportunity to deepen the auction while maintaining profitable arbitrage opportunities for participants. A deeper auction tightens the spread between the auction sell price and the DBR market price, reducing gas cost barriers and increasing sDOLA APY.
Recommended Actions:
Current: 1.26E+46
Proposed: 1.12E+47
Rationale: Deepening the auction balances sDOLA APY stability while ensuring the open market remains the primary venue for DBR trading. Excessive depth could cause prolonged revenue dips if DBR prices fall sharply, so maintaining moderation is crucial.
Assumes current DSA deposits = 34,223,692 DOLA
The first entry is showing the current as-is stats for DSA (no changes)
maxYearly RewardBudget | maxRewardPer DolaMantissa | Yearly DBR distributed | DBR per DOLA (annualized) | DSA APR | Annualized DAO Profit $ |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
30,000,000 | 0.95 | 30,000,000 | 0.877 | 6.79% | $327,336 |
60,000,000 | 0.95 | 32,512,507 | 0.95 | 7.36% | $132,617 |
60,000,000 | 0.9 | 30,801,323 | 0.90 | 6.98% | $265,234 |
60,000,000 | 0.85 | 29,090,138 | 0.85 | 6.59% | $397,850 |
60,000,000 | 0.8 | 27,378,954 | 0.80 | 6.20% | $530,467 |
The scenarios make it clear that the proposal compresses the DAO’s annual-profit margin. That trade-off is deliberate: richer incentives keep sDOLA among the top-yield stablecoins, supercharging TVL growth and network effects. Once that growth plateau is reached, the DAO retains full flexibility to widen the margin and restore a higher profit share.
After the 7 days ramp of the k value, the auction depth will be increased by roughly 3x from where it is prior to the proposal. On trades, this has the following impact:
Net effect: arbitrageurs clear more DBR per transaction at spreads much closer to the spot market, so (a) gas cost per $1000 arb falls, and (b) sDOLA APY nudges higher because the reserve empties more slowly.
When increasing the depth of the auction, there are 2 main considerations:
The downside of having an auction that is too deep, is the yield of sDOLA being more volatile, which potentially, for some weeks to be extremely low if either of the above happens. It is easier for the DAO to deepen the auction than it is to reduce the depth, as doing this requires many DBRs being sold on the market as K ramps down.
Please see the following graphs demonstrating the rate of price decrease of the auction under the new parameters:
By doubling the DSA reward ceiling and modestly deepening the sDOLA auction, we lift APY, preserve market-leading yield, and give the protocol room to grow. The trade-off is a temporary, controlled squeeze on DAO profit today for a larger, more sustainable revenue base tomorrow.
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Members allowed to make Drafts can sign the fact that they reviewed the Draft Proposal
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